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Failure resilience : Regardless of the effort put into a
program like SEI, failures - although "probablistic" • are
inevitable. Such failures can range from the loss of a
major system, to the malfunctioning of individual
components within a system. The more resilience or
ABSTRACT
robustness that is built into the program from the
Consideration is given to the critical operational issues beginning, the higher the probability that operations will
associated with large-scale space programs, like the be allowed to proceed despite such failures. Alternatives,
proposed Space Exploration Initiative (SEl), in order to where reasonable or needed to enhance safety, should always
demonstrate their intimate relationship with the Earth-to- be available. Clearly, because of the requirement to
orbit launch systems being used. These operational issues maintain a continuous access for SEI operations, as
include failure resilience and continuous access. It is described below, the need for resilience is a fundamental pre
shown that scenarios using expendable, vertically launched requisite.
Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicles (HLLVs) as the primary space
launch means, may be difficult to accomplish. This is Continuous access : Large scale manned spaceflight
because the performance characteristics of such vehicles - activities differ significantly from most other smaller-scale
most notably reliability and availability - contradict the operations because each element has to depend upon one or
identified critical operational requirements of SEI. An more other elements functioning properly. This differs
alternative strategy is outlined for the Lunar Base part of a fundamentally from the more classical space programs,
future SEI program. This scenario uses a duel launch such as communications and science satellites, that must
architecture consisting of the HLLV and the proposed fully carry all the systems needed to support their entire mission.
reusable, winged Aero-Space Plane Launcher (ASPL). Continuous access is needed to supply the hardware
Relevent technical issues of the hardware elements are elements (e.g. landers, habitats), logisitics (e.g. food, water,
identified and discussed from the total program perspective. air), spare parts for routine and unexpected maintenance
The rationale used to optimize the scenario is outlined, and (e.g. lights, valves etc.), the mission payloads (e.g. science
the potential value of carefully matching payload types to instrumentation), and the crew. Supply of each will need to
start with the first element launch and continue thereafter
the launcher performance is subsequently demonstrated.
on a regular and reliable basis over the program life-time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Another potentially critical concern relating to continuous
Regardless of the motivations, the establishment of a access is orbital testing. Developing subsystems, systems
and operational procedures for space applications usually
missions
manned
by
followed
permanent base on the Moon
to Mars - referred to under the generic title as the Space demands repeated testing to the "edge of the envelope."
Exploration Initiative - are unquestionably extraordinary Failures that occur during traditional test campaigns are
endeavors. The political, organizational and economic usually the only method of fully characterizing the
challenges inherent in such enterprises are immense. performance of a particular piece of hardware or operational
However, it is the array of technical problems that poses procedure. Indeed, hardware that is not rigorously tested
the greatest hurdles and, in many respects, these problems may cover up inherent design flaws that could lead to later
drive the political and organizational issues, especially failures. Obviously, from an engineering standpoint, the
those relating to economics. Thus, the choice of technical most prudent method of verifying SEI hardware and
solutions has a strong bearing on the chances of the procedures, especially complex systems like a lunar lander
or assembly operations, is to repeatedly test them in orbit
program being funded and remaining funded.
Unfortunately, because of the current high cost of space
The determination of the optimum technical solution for operations, coupled with limited opportunties, such testing
is minimized.
system
match
must
SEI is a complex process that
performance with the restrictions imposed by funding and
technology. However, because of the large-scale and long- The single common factor having the greatest impact on
term nature of the program, the operational issues are likely the above issues is the Earth-to-orbit launch vehicle.
to have the greatest impacts on the solution and, therefore, Throughout the paper, discussion will focus on the impacts
the
economics. Understanding precisely what is involved in launch vehicles have on SEI-type activities, within
supporting manned space programs like SEI is absolutely general context of those issues relating to failure resilience,
fundamental to determining the best overall solution. Two continuous access and orbital testing.
issues are pre-eminent The first is the ability of a
2. THE HEAVY-LIFT LAUNCH VEHICLE
particular operational scenario to absorb failures, and the
second is the need to maintain uninterrupted access to space
The utilization of heavy-lift launch vehicles (HLLV) seems
and the systems in space.
almost synonomous with any SEI-type activity that is
considered. Effectively, it is automatically assumed by
1 Vitttkg Rc*e»rchcr, CREST Bade Pblytechnique, P*a*. Franc*
many SEI planners that an HLLV is, firstly, a necessary
Re*e*rch Institute, Florida, USA
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capability and, secondly, the primary launch system.
Typically, HLLVs arc expendable, vertically launched
rockets such as the proposed Shuttle-C and ALS. It is true
that, because of the considerable amount of mass that needs
to be launched, some form of "bulk" launch system is
needed, and therefore requiring an HLLV. However, by
examining closely some of the technical problems inherent
with SEI, as identified in Section 1, it is clear that more
than just an HLLV-type launcher is required
Limitations of HLLVs

US military programs despite a similarly low Titan
reliability - the need for military intelligence far outways
the cost associated with a random failures. Even with the
possibility of an engine-out capability, it is difficult to see
how reliability can be significantly improved because
testing is so limited.
Availability : Launcher availability essentially dictates
when a user will be able to launch a payload. However,
experience has shown that on-time launch dates arc difficult
to guarantee. As with unreliability, unavailability is an
inherent feature of expendable launchers. The simple
reason being that a brand-new booster must be
manufactured and tested before launch and, because they arc
complex systems, the lead-time is considerable. In a very
real sense, the countdown starts several years before the
launch date. Availability can be increased through mass
production. However, mass production would not bring
down the cost of the launch enough to generate more users
and, in any case, critical line-items such as liquid rocket
motors tend to inhibit higher production rates, as is the
case with Ariane, Delta, Atlas and Titan, With the much
larger and more complex HLLV, it is difficult to see how a
high availability rate will be achieved - especially in view
of the high value of the payload being carried.

The positive aspects of HLLVs are well understood, with
the "low cost per pound" to orbit as the principal advantage
(1). However, on the negative side, despite this the actual
dedicated costs range anywhere from $100 million, as is
targetted for the original ALS, to $300+ million for a
Shuttle-derived vehicle. Even this is only a partial
representation as it does not fully take into account what is
actually being launched - i.e. the payload itself. If the
payload was just an equally priced "lump of mass," then
low cost per pound would clearly have some meaning. For
example, the propellant needed by each mission to the
Moon (e.g. around 75 tonnes) can be described precisely in
this way. However, for the remainder of the other payloads,
it is somewhat less than fair to describe them on a mass
Impact,^ of HIJ^V on SEI Activities
only basis.

There are many "generic** reasons why expendable launchers The use of the HLLV as the primary launch system for SEI
like the HLLV would negatively impact the payloads being adversely affects the critical failure resilience and continuous
access operational requirements in a profound way, as
carried, as discussed below:
discussed previously. The inevitable net consequence is
Reliability : Vertically launched expendable boosters arc that it drives the cost of the payloads up and reduces the
notoriously unreliable, compared with terrestrial rate at which they can be launched If the reliability and
transportation systems. Typically, boosters like the Atlas, availability arc limited, then the HLLV flight rate must be
Titan, Delta and Ariane have reliabilities that range from 90 minimized to avoid losses. Therefore, for the program to
to 98%. This is an inherent characteristic of such boosters, maximize their use, payloads will be designed to be as
and it is clearly important to understand why this should be highly capable as possible, meaning they must also be
the case. As mentioned in Section 1, extensive testing is highly integrated and lightweight These arc conflicting
fundamental to increasing reliability. However, because of requirements which increase the cost of the payload and
the demanding function they perform, launch systems tend reduce the number built This, in-turn, places higher
to be very large, complex and highly integrated pieces of reliability demands on the launcher - thus increasing the
machinery. Thus, as a direct consequence, expendable HLLV costs and impacting the availability.
launchers are expensive. The developer of an expendable
launcher is, as a result, in a "Catch-22** situation as many This viscious circle is further exasperated by the fact that
test launches are required to "iron-out" technical problems, SEI payloads will be critically dependent on payloads
but the cost to perform such tests is so high making it launched by other boosters in a continuous sequence.
unaffordable. Even performing several "tens" of test Thus, the loss of one payload would have a extreme
launches (assuming this was possible) would seem an economic and schedule impact on the total program. For
unnecessary luxury in view of the uncertain "probabilistic" example, in the NASA 90-day Study of Human
nature of the failures and $1+ billion price tag. Yet, history Exploration of the Moon and Mars (2), 3 or 4 HLLVs arc
has shown that launchers fail with an uncomfortable needed one after the other to assemble the hardware for just
frequency. For example, the Ariane launcher had only five one lunar landing mission. At this rate, after only two or
"test" flights, but has experienced five failures in about 40 three sorties to the Moon, there would be a better than
missions, making it one of the most unreliable launchers. 50:50 chance of losing one of the next boosters.
Despite this, Ariane continues to win orders for commercial
satellites, and the users arc prepared to suffer the Figure 1 attempts to show the relationship between flight
consequences of random losses, because of the high rate, loss rate and down-time as a function of reliability as
economic value of the mission. The same is true of the generated by a Monte Carlo simulator. As a reference point,

nomimally it takes about 4 years to build up to the
maximum flight rate of 10 per year, achieving a total of 88
flights in the 10-year span. However, even at 98% when 2
losses occur, it takes 7 or 8 years before about 10 flights
per year are achieved and, perhaps more importantly, only
78 mission are flown. This reduction is brought about by
the **knock-on effects" of down-time.
LOMM FV* DowrvTIm

HLLV FLIGHT VERSUS
TIME & RELIABILITY
Figure 1

significantly more difficult than terrestrial transportation, it
does help to highlight the intimate relationship of the
transportation system with the role it fulfills.
3. THE AERO-SPACE PLANE LAUNCHER

The aero-space plane launcher (ASPL) is one concept for a
space transportation system which is radically different than
existing systems. Essentially, it is a fully resusable,
highly maintainable, one or two-staged winged vehicle
capable of taking-off and landing horizontally. Many studies
have shown that this type of configuration is critical to
significantly reducing dedicated launch costs (3). Achieving
such a capability is an immensely difficult task, as is well
understood within the aerospace community. But, in
general, all indications are that this will be a realisable goal
within the next 10-15 years. Assuming it is indeed
achievable, the impacts on reliability and availability could
be as follows:
Reliability : The most significant advantage positively
impacting reliability is that the ASPL can be recovered.
During the testing phase, it should be possible to
incrementally expand the envelope so that eventually after
many flights, and with the same vehicle, orbital flight is
achieved. Thus, gradually over a campaign of many
flights, the individual characteristics of the test vehicles can
be evaluated. This is clearly critical to enhancing
reliability. During the operational phase, ASPL-like
vehicles should be able to return to Earth following an
abort and, thereby, providing a means to recover the payload
and make another launch attempt at a later date. Although
ASPL-specific failures are possible, it is interesting to note
that if the ASPL experienced the same "type" of failures as
suffered by the ELVs in recent years, the ASPL and payload
would probably have been recovered.

Nowhere within the 90-Day report are contingency
measures described to absorb such a HLLV loss. This is
typical of such studies. It is considered unlikely that
another HLLV would be risked immediately after a failure,
especially if the payload being carried was of very high
value, such as a lander. (Note: Scenarios with "cheap*9
payloads are discussed in Section 5.) The typical down-time
for current ELVs launching relatively inexpensive payloads
is 6 to 12 months. The technical and organizational
problems associated with reducing this down-time to
months or weeks, with the much more complex HLLV
booster carrying an expensive and schedule-driven payload, Availability : Once operational vehicles have been
should not be underestimated.
introduced, availability is enhanced compared with ELVs
because a new vehicle does not have to be manufactured and
A further problem relates to orbital testing. The Space verified for each mission. Problems associated with
Shuttle is, as yet, the only vehicle capable of returning maintaining the large infrastructures needed to support the
payloads for inspection after test However, the limitations construction of ELVs, together with the large ground crews
placed on its flight rate will effectively eliminate needed to integrate the various stages, are avoided. In
consideration of its regular use for SEI-type test activities. addition, ASPLs also provide the potential to containerize
The alternative use of an HLLV, or any other large ELV, for the payloads in a manner that completely standardizes the
such operations will do little to help the situation for many interfaces between the payload and launcher (4). This may
of the same reasons outlined above.
allow the satellite-to-launcher integration process to be
reduced to hours, compared with the current days or weeks.
Hie use of the HLLV for SH can be compared with the Thus, because the ground operations are minimized, greater
following terrestrial analogy : Consider what the status of opportunities are provided for higher flight rates and
inter-continental trade and development would be like today significantly reduced dedicated launch costs.
without the invention of the aircraft, and if it had to rely on
ocean going vessels. Especially if such vessels could not be To summarize, an ASPL-like capability could provide a
tested first, if they couM not be recalled to port if a problem much more "user-friendly** means of accessing space. The
arose, if these ships had to be discarded after only one ability to launch payloads significantly more frequently
voyage and if the users had to pay the full production costs reliably, when demanded, and at a much lower costs than
of the vessels. Although it is dangerous to make this sort existing launchers, is expected to have a profound impact
of direct comparison, primarily because space launching is on the current space operations including SEI (5).
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A number of ASPL programs exist today with the most launch costs. HOTOL, which was started in 1984 as a
notable being the NASP. HOWL and Sanger Programs. joint project between British Aerospace and Rolls Royce,
For background, the key features of each are summarized.
uses a much more conservative design approach and more
available technologies than NASP in order to reduce the
NASP & NDVs
development risk uncertainties. For example, air-breathing
only occurs up to Mach 5.5, and in-coming air is slowed
Since 1986, the US Government and the industrial down to subsonic speeds prior to combustion. In addition,
contractors have spent nearly $2 billion on the National the original classified RB-545 engine was designed to allow
Aero-Space Plane Program which intends to develop an full testing of individual sections first, allowing the engine
experimental aircraft - the X-30 (Figure 2) - capable of performance to be fully characterized on the ground before
reaching orbit with a single-stage. NASP is generally installation on the vehicle. This is different to the NASP
regarded as one of the most technically challenging projects Program which must build and fly a full-up aircraft to test
ever initiated, and the program is well known within the the engine.
aerospace community for its research in the areas of
advanced materials, supersonic combustion ramjets, The HOTOL Program was slowed when the UK
computational fluid dynamics and systems integration.
Government decided to discontinue funding and BAe were
asked to look for international support Unfortunately,
these efforts where thwarted by the UK Government refusal
to declassify the RB-545. In September 1990, BAe
anounced an agreement with the Soviet Ministry of
Aviation Industry for joint studies of a pure rocket version the so-called "Interim HOTOL" - launched off the back of
the Antonov-225 aircraft This study is presently
progressing. This, and the original version of HOTOL, are
primarily unmanned - though "manable" - vehicles designed
to place around 7-10 tonnes in low Earth orbit for a cost of
about $5m per launch, or about $15m if development and
production cost recovery is amortized.
THE NATIONAL AERO-SPACE PLANE
Figure 2

The primary purpose of the NASP Program is to develop
the technologies, systems and techniques needed for the
eventual production of an operational fleet of aero-space
plane launch vehicles, the NASP-Derived Vehicles.
Presently, the "reference" NDV is designed as a highly
maintainable vehicle capable of being turned around in a
few days or hours, and able to place in Space Station
Freedom orbit payloads of about 10 tonnes, at a cost of
between $5-20 million per launch. Launch rates could be
around 50 mission per year with a loss reliability of better
than 99.5%. (Note : The recent OTA report (6) estimated
that the worst case operational cost pa* launch, with
facilities and other fixed annual costs amortized in, would
be about $12m, with the best case being $2m.)
The NASP Program is midway through Phase 2, with
funding running at $258m this year, and a decision in
March 1993 is scheduled to be made to develop the first
two experimental vehicles. After this, it is estimated that
an operational NDV could gradually replace the Space
Shuttle before the end of the next decade.

HJZEQL
The HOTOL Launcher was conceived as a vehicle optimized
solely for the purpose of significantly reducing operational

Contrary to the NASP and HOTOL Programs, Germany
believes that the technologies for single-stage-to-orbit will
not be available until at least 2010 or later. Therefore, they
have embarked on the two-stage-to-orbit design known as
Sdnger, which is currently the reference vehicle
configuration in the German National Hypersonic Research
Program, and is funded at $250m over five years,
Preparations are underway in an effort to "Eufopeanize" the
program for development within ESA. It is hoped that a
prototype will fly in the early part of the next decade, with
an operational system available by about 2010.
Sdnger consists of a first stage that carries the Horns
upperstage up to a speed of about Mach 7, at which point
the upperstage is separated Horus comes in two
configurations: the Horus-M for manned missions (plus
3 tonnes of payload to a Freedom (Kbit) and the Horus-C
for unmanned cargo missions with a payload capability of
about 7.5 tonnes to an equatorial orbit The estimated
launch cost is about $25m per mission.
4. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION

This section outlines an in orbit space transportation
architecture based around the availability of an ASPL and
an HLLV booster as defined earlier. For demonstration
purposes, the scenario is specifically scoped for supporting
a sustainable and long-term (>10 yrs) human presence on
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The STV is
the Moon. Mars is not directly diseased. The intention is are thinner to reflect the higher density,
to demonstrate the practicality of such a scenario and launched without cryogenic propellants.
highlight some of the critical technical, programmatic and
infrastructure-related issues that are raised
Guidelines

The following is a list of some of the general "guidelines**
used in developing scenario :
establish a permanent and expandable lunar base
optimize the utilization of both launchers
optimize reusable versus expendable hardware
minimize other infrastructure elements as practical
ensure that consequences of failures are "tolerable**
ensure a crew return capability to the Earth
develop strategies for "rapid** contingency missions.
Finally, there is no fundamental reason why the in-space
transportation elements must be large. Indeed, for the
reasons outlined in section 2, it has been the incorporation
of HLLVs as the primary launch system in a number of
previous studies that has driven the large size of the
elements. It is considered that for cost and operational
reasons there are many positive advantages to remaining
modestly sized where appropriate, at least during the first
few years of operations.
Elements
The basic transportation elements consist of the :
Space Transfer Vehicle (STV)
Manned Lunar Lander (MLL)
Cargo Lunar Lander (CLL)
Trans-Lunar Injection Stage (TLIS)

SPACE TRANSFER VEHICLE (STV)
Figure 3

is fully
Each of these elements and their functional requirements are Manned Lunar Lander : The MLL (Figure 4) Moon.
reusable and is sized to place a crew of 3 or 4 on the
described as follows :
The central structure is composed of two frustrums joined
on that of
Space Transfer Vehicle : The STV (Figure 3) is fully together by a short cylindrical insert, and is based Similarly,
reusable and its primary functional requirements are to place the STV, except that the MLL insert is shorter.
same
the MLL in lunar orbit, and then later return the Lunar Base the propellant tanks of the MLL have the
STV, but
crew and their lander to Earth orbit This concept is similar hemispherical ends and interfaces as those on the power
lo that proposed by British Aerospace (7) and utilizes an the cylindrical center section is shorter. The avionics, where
umbrella-like system for deploying a 200 m2 aerobrake and other subsystems would also be similar to say
made from a high temperature cloth similar to that used by appropriate. At this level of definition it is difficult would
the Shuttle Obiter. The value of this approach is that it whether the commonality between the components a few
could allow the compact stowage of the complete STV lead to significant production cost savings, as only
built
within one ASPL, allowing deployment without the need STVs and MLLs would, at least initially, be the
for on-orbit assembly. (If such a design prooved unfeasible, However, using a commonality approach reduces
an alternative approach could utilize an aero-brake number of unique systems that have to be designed,
and
consisting of several solid "petals** that unfold following characterized and qualified, thereby, enhancing reliability
launch. This "solid** aerobrake could be left on-orbit, for reduces the spare parts burden. The crew cabin is around
example, while the core of the vehicle can be launched and 3.5m in diameter and is equipped with a Freedom standard
returned independently.) The STV central thrust structure is docking hatch. The MLL, like the STV, is launched
a single
surrounded by two hydrogen tanks and two oxygen tanks. without propellant and also without the crew on
Hie four tanks are the same length, but the oxygen tanks ASPL mission.

quantities of propellant near the Space Station (see the next
subsection). The TLIS is conceived as being essentially a
"dumb** stage and is equipped only with sufficient avionics
to keep it pointing in a fixed direction following orbital
insertion. This is necessary to allow the STV/MLL or CLL
to dock with it All other control and monitoring
equipment is provided by the MLL CM* CLL.

MANNED LUNAR LANDER (MLL)
Figure 4

Cargo Lunar Lander : The CLL (Figure 5) is based on the
MLL except that the propellant tanks and central structure
are somewhat longer for more optimum performance. The
manned cabin and crew related systems also have been
removed The CLL is conceived as an expendable vehicle
able to land from 10 to as much as 15 tonnes of cargo on
the Moon per mission such as, for example, modules,
rovers etc. The CLL is, at least in the early operations,
conceived as being expendable. From a total cost
perspective, it is probably cheaper to use each lander once
than to recover it, since twice as many missions are
required to land the same mass using a reusable lander as
compared with an expendable version. In addition, the STV
TRANS-LUNAR INJECTION STAGE (TLIS)
is not needed for the cargo missions, simplifying orbital
MANNED & CARGO CONFIGURATIONS
operations and lessoning the burden on the STV, essentially
Figure 6
reserving it for the manned missions where reliability is
rather more critical. The CLL is also launched dry on one Space Station Node Facilities
ASPL mission. The payload would be launched separately.
The value of on-orbit servicing of the transportation
elements is the subject of intense debate. However, in an
ASPL era it can be expected that the on-orbit facilities will
be considerably more extensive than those planned for
Freedom, simply because of the available, reliable and
affordable capabilities of the new launcher system.
Therefore, the trade-off may favor on-orbit servicing because
access to the facilities is possible. Conversely, even in the
ASPL era it may still be more cost effective to return the
MLL or STV after every mission for precisely the same
reasons.
CARGO LUNAR LANDER (CLL)
Figure 5
Ultimately, the transition to on-orbit servicing practises
will arise once the flight rate to Moon increases to the
Trans-Lunar Injection Stage : The expendable TLIS (Figure point where it is more cost effective to leave the hardware
6) is launched on a single HLLV booster and uses as many on-orbit For example, it might be cheaper to invest in
components of the launcher as possible (e.g. tanks, engines orbital facilities to support servicing operations, rather than
etc). The TLIS, which has a mass of 60 - 90 tonnes at pushing the ASPL to steadily increasing flight rates,
launch, performs the trans-lunar injection burn and carries especially since the total cost of an ASH, loss would
all the propellant needed by the TLIS as well as the STV, probably be comparable to that of the servicing facilities.
MLL or CLL. This avoids ever needing to bring large It is possible to envisage a situation during initial
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operations where the MLL and STV is brought back to
Earth and, as more experience is gained with the launch
system and the behaviour of the lunar transportation
elements has been more thoroughly characterized, a gradual
transition to servicing facilities would be realizable. It is
also important to note that in the Intervening period before
orbital servicing is possible, the unique capabilities of the
ASPL would allow the testing out of servicing-type
operations in space, again because frequent access to space
is more practical. Such a situation does not exist today, and
will not until a vehicle with ASPL-like capabilities is
introduce!
Assuming such a scenario, a conceptual design for a
servicing facility is shown as part of Figure 7. The design
assumed the use of Freedom in its present (Jan. 1991)
configuration purely as a means to demonstrate what might
be practical. The concept does not require the use of the
Freedom truss structure, but instead uses two pairs of
pessufiied modules, arranged .in. a "L"» docked to the.
middle nodes (3 and. 4). Tie lower end of 'die outer module
is equipped to accept either an MLL or STV. In addition,
these modules are- equipped with t conical skirt that is
draped around 'the docked MLL or STV to provide an
isothermal eai.viron.ment and. protection against meteroids.
direct
Htts» die ooncept shown in Figure 1
to the- MLL and STV, thus reserving any
hazardous EVA activity to only those off-nominal
where EVA is the only alternative, such as the
thermal insulation.. In the ease of the .MLL,
of
is particularly attractive as it ensures

this

to all of 'the internal, systems, allowing
mil am:ttlatic»,s to lie perttw«e4 In the
of the STV, It is possible to envisage a design where
are located in a pressurized section
aft the critical
so as to allow routine
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crew can enter the MLL and perform verification checks
between both vehicles. When the mated STV/MLL had
been cleared for flight, an HLLV would launch the TLIS. If
this HLLV fails to reach orbit, the STV and MLL would
remain safely at the Station until the next TLIS launch can
be attempted.

MANNED MISSION LEO OPERATIONS
Figure 7
Once 'the TLIS had. been, placed in a safe- orbit, the
STV/MLL would, rendezvous with 'the TLIS and dock.
Propellants from, the stage'- would 'then be pumped, in to the
STV/MLL tanks. The composite would, then be fully
is
checked out before 'the TLIS main propulsion
Ignited, to place the STV/MLL into bans-lunar .injection,
8) follows
Hie remainder of the mission trajectory
a classic dpo/fo-style Lunar Orbit Rendezvous strategy,
with the STV performing the' Lunar orbit
to the.
manoeuvre before the MLL separates .and
surface* Meanwhile, the STV1 remains in Lunar
boilits aero-brake facing 'the- Sun. to
and
lie
fhe MLL. has
off,
an
with the STV, the. STV
the
injection burn, and the aero-brake is 'then, used ID
of '(he STV
a
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engine.
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It should be noted that the scenario outlined above always
returns the MIX to Earth orbit after every mission, as
opposed to leaving the descent section in Lunar orbit as
suggested by many previous studies. Thus, it eliminates
the need to perform propellant or propellant tank transfer.
In addition, and perhaps much more critically, it allows the
MLL to be fully checked out before the next crew boards.
This is particularly important during the first few years of
operations because of safety uncertainties relating to the
performance of vehicles like lunar landers. It should be
appreciated that the ability to return the MLL arises by
virtue of its small size.
o Cargo Missions
Lunar cargo missions are much simpler than manned
missions because the hardware is expendable. A typical
cargo mission would involve the launch of the CLL and
cargo on separate ASPL flights, and subsequently
integrating them at the station. Once completed, the TLIS
would be launched and the mated CLL/cargo would
autonomously rendezvous with the TLIS and dock. After
the TLIS is launched, the CLL/cargo would either insert
into lunar orbit or descend directly to the surface.
Future Expansion
If, in the future, a Lunar oxygen production facility is set
up, it is possible to envisage a situation where the CLL on
the Moon would be partially refuelled, loaded with excess
liquid oxygen and returned to Earth. The main problem
would be that the CLL must trade payload for the extra
hydrogen fuel needed for the return. Nevertheless,
potentially several tonnes of liquid oxygen could be
returned to the Earth. Whether sufficient oxygen could be
returned economically to refuel a fully reusable TLIS, has
not been estimated at this stage. However, a future scenario
that eliminates the HLLV is clearly advantageous, but only
if at least two different types of ASPLs are available.
5. SCENARIO OPTIMIZATION

The scenario described in Section 4 is intended to
demonstrate a level optimization that could be possible if a
launch architecture consisting of the ASPL-type launcher
and a HLLV booster is available. The rationale and
approach for the scenario is driven by consideration of the
actual payloads, and the requirements they place on the
launch system, as seen from the critical perspective of their
operational needs.
Of particular importance, the
optimization process develops a scenario which takes
advantage of the best characteristics of the ASPL and
HLLV, while minimizing the burden on each.

reliability and availability, as diKas«*i in Section 3,
Therefore, it seems reasonable to reserve the HLLV for
those "cheap** payloads- which can be launched In, bulk, and
as infrequently as possible to minimise the HLLV flight
rates and, therefore, HLLV loss fates,. In addition, such
payloads should not be critical, to servicing and
maintenance-type activities in order to minimize'
availability concerns. Because propellant makes up 'the
majority of the mass, this is an ideal payload for the HLLV,
Once a decision has been made to use the .HLLV in this
manner, it seems reasonable to 'Configure the propellant
tank to also be an expendable lower stage (TLIS), and use,
where possible, suitable components from the HLLV such.
as engines, structure and avionics. This might 'be a
sensible approach because these components would already
be manufactured on a production line and, therefore, the
additional cost impact might be relatively "minor." It
should be noted that an alternative approach of launching a
reusable stage might seem initially to be attractive when
considered independently. However, because of the
additional operational complexities involved in maintaining
such a large stage in-orbit, combined with the need to refuel
it with propellant (e.g. tank exchange), when considered
from an overall system standpoint it appears somewhat less
attractive.
Finally, launching inexpensive and mass produced payloads
makes a significant contribution towards reducing the
down-time after an HLLV failure. This should be corn pared
with the alternative of using an HLLV as the primary
launcher for all the STV, MLL and other critical hardware
elements. Since such payloads are more expensive, and
only a few are produced, more care and time will be taken
to ensure that the HLLV will not fail again immediately
after an initial failure. Therefore, it is considered likely that
higher risk levels are more tolerable if the payload being
launched is inexpensive and built in numbers, especially in
a contingency situation. (Note : This is essentially the
strategy used by the USSR Space Program.)
ASPL Utilization

In an SEI scenario, the value of a launcher exhibiting
ASPL-type performance characteristics is its ability to
launch reliably and frequently. Therefore, its performance
should be reserved for those payloads and missions it best
serves. Specifically, expensive, operational and maintenance
critical elements. If possible, operational elements like die
STV, MLL, CLL and lunar base dements should be
launched individually, because there is a higher dunce of
reaching orbit, or recovered after an abort, compared with
the HLLV. The ASPL also offers the potential to return
elements for ground refurbishment - something impossible
with HLLVs. For orbital maintenance-type missions,, the
quick reaction capability of the ASPL allows rapid access An HLLV is needed within SEI scenarios because of the particularity in a contingency situation. As discussed
large mass-to-orbit requirements. However, by its very earlier, the need for a responsive "sortie" capability in largenature, the HLLV is expected to exhibit relatively tow scale space operations should not be underestimated
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In addition, during the development of SEI hardware, the
ability to test out each element thoroughly in orbit first,
could be useful for the reasons highlighted in Section 1.
The availability of ASPL-type capabilities would be critical
here because of the ability to launch at the kind of high
flight rates needed to support multiple test flights over a
relatively short time-scale. The modest payload size,
recovery capability and low dedicated operational launch
costs would also contribute significantly to its utilization
in this role. These characteristics are directly opposite to
those offered by the HLLV.

with the much cheaper replacement cost of the massproduced HLLV and mass-produced TLIS stage. In an
extreme scenario, if access to the lunar base was absolutely
necessary, then it is possible to envisage a situation where
another TLIS is launched immediately, even if the problems
of the previous HLLV failure had not been resolved.
6. CONCLUSIONS

There appears to be rational arguments to suggest that it
may be difficult or impractical to support long-term lunar
operations using expendable, vertically launched heavy-lift
It should also be noted that although the ASPL could type vehicles as the primary launch system because of
conceivably launch propellant, this would not seem to be a their low reliability and low flight rates. The reasons are
suitable use of the vehicle as up to 10 flights per lunar based on the operational requirements to maintain a level of
mission could be needed. Although the total launch cost failure resilience and to ensure that continuous access to the
would be about the same, there might be a danger in orbital hardware is always possible. Such requirements are
pushing the ASPL unnecessarily to higher flight rates, and indicative of large-scale space activities just as they are for
thereby increasing the probability of failure, especially any terrestrial activity. For converse reasons, the proposed
while low on the ASPL learning curve. Also, the added aero-space plane launcher would not be able to support
complexities of significantly increased orbital operations in lunar activities on its own. However, a combined
exchanging up to 10 propellant tanks, could be prohibitive, architecture consisting of an ASPL fleet and HLLVs seems
Launching propellant does not seem to be the best use for ideally suited for SEI-type applications, provided careful
optimization is performed so that payloads are properly
an ASPL.
matched to each launcher. Such an optimization leads to a
scenario that attempts to ensure continuous access to space,
while simultaneously being able to minimize the highly
A critical feature of the optimization process is the launch disruptive impacts of a launch failure and subsequent standfailure resilience, that is, the response to failure of one of down period*

the launch systems. Scenarios involving the failure of
It is clear that the scenario is critically dependent on the
either the ASPL or HLLV are described below :

After the initiation of lunar base
MPL Failure :
operations, if an ASPL fails and the fleet is grounded - a
situation 'that is likely to occur during 'the early operational.
phase of the ASPL - access to the Moon would still be
possible through use of the HLLV, albeit at a degfaded level
until the ASPL is available* For example, in a 'Scenario
where Freedom is used as a node,, the STV and .MLL will
already, be in oibit Hercfbie* for a manned mission, one
one for the TUB
or two HLLV flights would be
launch, and the other for the crew and logistics, assuming a
Personnel Launch SystenKype capsule* If Freedom was
not being used, then it may also be necessary to launch «
already stacked STV and MLL on to owed MLLV flight
mil the TUGS can be bunched. A.
and dock, ii to
similar scenario ft*' cargo missions !dii be envisaged.
Consideration of this type of scenario should be an
m understanding 'tie need for a USD node,
important
is It could leduce the ^itepeiicSgicc. mi bwden on the launch
system*
MLLV

: Alternatively! if an HLLV Ms*

m

the moon would havr m be halted tor m long as it late to

outlined
mortify the HLLV* Bowero; far the
earlier to His section thta smi-ctowi time is likely to be
significantly toss than that experienced if an ASH- filled
Tils is feeeiise the cost of an ASPL and its ptyloai is so
much higher* and oily a few of each are built, compared

development of a vehicle exhibiting ASPL-type
performance characteristics.. Although it is not certain 'that
such a vehicle is technically feasible, the variety of national
programs presently underway seems to indicate that the
outcome will be .positive. The potential high value to' all
space operations of ASPL-type launchers should ;povicfe
further• motivation to encourage their development.
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